Traditional leadership in a democratic South Africa – a millstone around the neck of the ruling party or an integral part of governance in an African country? – a critical analysis: Risimati Samuel Khandlhela

The institution of traditional leadership in South Africa (known as *ubukhosi* in Nguni languages and *bogosi* in Sotho languages) has been in existence since time immemorial. It has outlived colonialism and apartheid, even in the face of often brutal efforts to annihilate it. The survival of the institution of traditional leadership can partly be attributed to it essentially being African in its make up and outlook. Due to the uniqueness of the African traditional leadership institution, foreign forces and influences have failed to destroy it over the centuries. The different methods, approaches and strategies employed by colonialism and apartheid failed to bring the institution of traditional leadership to its knees, as it proved to be resilient. One would therefore expect that in a democratic South Africa, where political power is in the hands of the African majority, under the oldest liberation movement, the African National Congress (ANC), the institution would be experiencing its golden years, and would have an opportunity to regain the ground it has lost during the colonial and apartheid eras. Traditional leaders are after all among the founding fathers of the African National Congress (ANC), which was founded as the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) in 1912. (*ANC Today*, Vol. 10 No. 7, February – 04 March 2010).

Is it therefore not ironic that some traditional leaders are today longing for the “good old times” during apartheid, when they claim to have had some meaningful powers, roles and functions, compared to the current era of democracy when they have been stripped of most of these, have been relegated to ceremonial figures who often have to justify their existence?

This paper seeks to critically analyse the impact democracy has had on the institution of traditional leadership. An overview will be made on the powers, roles and functions of traditional leadership during the apartheid era, as per various legislation. This will be compared to their roles and functions in the current post-apartheid South Africa, as per the constitutional and legislative framework. At face value, it may look like traditional leaders in South Africa are in many ways better off, especially if compared to their counterparts in other African countries. In fact, some African governments in the post-colonial era even attempted to abolish the institution of traditional leadership altogether, Tanzania and Mozambique being examples.

On the one hand, some would argue that, unlike in some African countries, the South African Constitution and other legislation has given traditional leadership recognition, and has gone further and created national, provincial and local structures that did not exist during the apartheid era. Others, on the other hand, would however argue that although at face value the legislative framework seems to have advanced the cause of traditional leadership in several ways, in reality the situation on the ground paints a somewhat different picture. The post-apartheid legislation that regulates matters of traditional leadership is skewed largely in favour of local government at the expense of traditional leadership.

After making a comparative analysis of legislation as well as the practicalities on the ground regarding the powers, role and functions of traditional leadership vis-à-vis local
government, one will hopefully be in the position to make an assessment of the position of the traditional leadership institution. Where gaps have been identified, an attempt will be made to do the not so easy task of making proposals regarding possible solutions on how both the system of elected government and the hereditary traditional leadership can possibly co-exist, given the reality that to a large extent they share a common constituency, the African people in the rural areas.

It is undisputed that that traditional leadership in Africa constituted the original government for African communities and people. The different African peoples, who spoke different, but often related languages, were under the rule of different traditional leaders. Each traditional leader possessed legislative, executive and judicial powers, which were exercised in council, meaning that he or she did not possess absolute powers, the powers were exercised at the advice of council, which often comprised family members, relatives and selected members of the community with special skills. This arrangement prevented traditional leaders from being dictators. While some traditional leaders ruled over their smaller communities, the more powerful ones extended their territories and power by subjugating the weaker ones by forming kingdoms. The best known kingdom in South Africa is the Zulu Kingdom that was formed by Shaka Zulu. Other powerful kingdoms in Southern Africa that were formed, which are still in existence until this very day, were the Swazi and the Basotho Kingdoms (Maylam, P, A History of the African People of South Africa: from the Early Iron Age to the 1970s, 1986).

The advent of colonialism impacted negatively on the institution of traditional leadership. Powerful kingdoms such as the Zulu were severely weakened, as the colonial powers, notably the British and Boers, sought to dismantle the powerful kingdoms. The Battle of the Blood River (1838), the Siege of Ulundi that followed the humiliating defeat of the British in 1879 at Isandlwana are some of the battles waged by the outside forces that eventually led to the fall of the Zulu Kingdom.

The great war between the British and the Boers (1899-1902), that is commonly known as the Anglo-Boer, which resulted in the defeat of the Afrikaners, led to political reconciliation, which was symbolised by the formation of the Union Government in 1910. Despite the fact that African people fought on both sides of the British and Boers, the reconciliation between the two white tribes excluded the Africans altogether. The exclusion of the African people in the formation of the Union Government led to the formation of the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) in 1912.

The Union Government passed several pieces of legislation that regulated the affairs of Black people in South Africa. Such legislation included the notorious Native Land Act of 1913, that confined African people to 13% of the land, and the Black Administration Act (1927) that sought to regulate the affairs of African people.

The coming to power of the Afrikaner-led National Party in 1948 saw a promulgation of a myriad of legislation that control African people. Such legislation included the Black Authorities Act of 1951, (Act No. 68 of 1951) that, among others, laid the foundation for the establishment of the ethnic based “homelands”, which through their mickey mouse parliaments, in turn promulgated a variety of legislation to regulate their own affairs. Ironically, most if not all if the so-called Presidents and Chief Ministers in
these homelands were traditional leaders, some of whom were accused of being puppets of the apartheid regime. This image of being puppets, sell outs and corroborators is still engrained in the minds of some of the politicians of today, and this can be considered to be one contributing factor for the side lining of the traditional leadership institution. It would of course be disingenuous to label all traditional leaders during the apartheid era as sell outs, some have played a significant role in the liberation struggle. The formation of the Congress of Traditional Leaders (CONTRALESA) is one such case in point. CONTRALESA was formed in 1987 by traditional leaders from Moutse who were opposed to KwaNdebele Independence. The organisation aligned itself with the United Democratic Front (UDF) and then banned (ANC). CONTRALESA was launched nationally in 1989. After the demise of apartheid, the organisation campaigned for the constitutional recognition of the traditional leadership, and it is credited with the drafting of Chapter 12 of the South African Institution (South African History Online, 16 March 2011).

The advent of a democratic dispensation is South Africa in 1994 saw the disbandment of the ethnic based homelands and the formation of nine provinces. Insofar as the institution of traditional leadership is concerned, for the first time traditional leadership enjoyed Constitutional recognition. Chapter 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, (Act No. 108 of 1996), gave recognition to the institution, status and role of traditional leadership. The Constitution further provided for national legislation to provide for a role of traditional leadership as an institution at a local level on matters affecting local communities and to deal with matters relating to traditional leaders, customary law and the customs of communities observing a system of customary law. Furthermore, the Constitution also made provision for the establishment of houses of traditional leaders through national and provincial legislation (Chapter 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa).

Chapter 7 of the Constitution explains in detail the role of local government. It states that “The local sphere of government consists of municipalities, which must be established for the territory of the Republic.” (Act 108, 1996, Chapter 7, Clause 151 [1]). Chapter 7 is silent about the role of the traditional leadership.

The Constitutional provisions were duly followed by the promulgation of national and provincial legislation that established the National and Nine Provincial Houses of Traditional Leaders, and the Local Houses of Traditional Leaders within District Municipalities where there are traditional leaders.

The National Council of Traditional Leaders Act, 1997, (Act. No. 10 of 1997) which was later replaced by the National House of Traditional Leaders Act, 2009, (Act. No 22 of 2009), established a structure of traditional leadership at a national level, the National House of Traditional Leaders (NHTL). Currently the National House of Traditional Leaders has a total of twenty-three (23) members, three (3) each from the Provincial Houses of Eastern Cape, Free State, KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo, Mpumalanga, Northern Cape, North West, and the only two traditional leaders from Gauteng, where there is no Provincial House of Traditional Leaders. The Western Cape Province is not represented in the NHTL, as there are no officially recognised
traditional leaders in that Province. Two of the Members of the NHTL are full time, while the other twenty-one (21) serve on a part time basis.

The NHTL is located within the Department of Traditional Affairs (DTA) and the Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) Ministry. It has two seats: the administrative seat in the capital city (Pretoria) and the political seat in Parliament (Cape Town), where it also holds its Quarterly Sittings. It is allocated a budget, staff and offices by the Department of Traditional Affairs. Its wide ranging functions are defined in terms of the National House Act. Most of the functions revolve around providing advice and support to government.

Another key legislation for the institution is the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act, 2009, (Act. No. 23 of 2009). This Act, which was first passed in 2003, amongst others, makes provision for the allocation of the roles to traditional leadership by national government departments.

It is also important to note that traditional leaders are not officials or civil servants. They are categorised as public office bearers in terms of the Remuneration of Public Office Bearers Act, 1998, (Act No. 20 of 1998). Other public office bearers in the same category include the President, Judges, Members of Parliament, Members of the Provincial Legislatures, Mayors, Councillors and Magistrates. The salaries and benefits of all public office bearers are determined by the Independent Commission on the Remuneration of Public Office Bearers. However, despite being public office bearers, the salaries and benefits of many categories of traditional leaders are not in line with this status, compared to other categories of office bearers. In terms of benefits, many traditional leaders do not enjoy benefits such as the pensions and medical aid. Consequently, it is quite common for a traditional leader to die without adequate resources in place to afford him a dignified funeral, and to leave something to look after his wife/wives and children.

Some provincial government departments have policies to that cater for the burial of certain categories of traditional leaders, notably kings/queens and senior traditional leaders), and not headmen / headwomen. With regard to medical aid benefits, the majority of traditional leaders do not enjoy this benefit, primarily for two reasons: first because government has not made any provision for the subsidization of their medical aid, and second, their salaries are very little, and hence cannot afford medical aid contributions. It is also very interesting to note that despite the fact that Parliamentary Medical Scheme for Public Office Bearers is the preferred medical scheme for public office bearers. However, in terms of the recommendations by the Commission on the Remuneration of Public Office Bearers, the designated medical scheme for traditional leaders is the Government Employees Medical Scheme (GEMS), that is tailor made for public servants.

Yes, traditional leaders serving in the National and Provincial Houses of Traditional Leaders have some benefits, benefits of which include official residences, official vehicles with drivers. Nevertheless, without pension and medical aid benefit, when their respective terms of office come to an end, they often leave empty handed, as there is not even a car scheme for traditional leaders.
Furthermore, regarding traditional leaders serving in Houses, there is a good will gesture benefit that is commonly referred to as “ex gratia payment”. This is the once off payment that is given to members of the National or Provincial Houses, at the expiry of their houses’ term of office, which is five years. There are three strange things about the payment of ex gratia: first, its approval is at the discretionary mercy of the respective political head, (Minister or MEC), second, there are no guidelines regarding the amount, these are also at the discretion of the political head concerned, and third, while some provincial houses members have received the payment on a number of occasions, members from other provincial houses have never received any ex gratia at all. When it comes to local government councillors, all non-returning councillors across the country are assured of the payment of a once off gratuity grant in terms of the guidelines of the recommendation of the Commission for the Remuneration of Public Office Bearers in 2011, and the COGTA Government Circular of September 2016.

Another serious discrepancy regarding the benefits for traditional leaders that is worth mentioning is that some provincial government departments regularly buy their vehicles for traditional leaders, often every five years. The Provinces of Limpopo, North West, Mpumalanga and the Northern Cape are among the provincial government departments that do this, while the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal Provinces have never done so. Unlike traditional leaders, municipal councillors, irrespective of their location, are treated equally in all respects.

Before the democratic dispensation in South Africa, traditional leaders from the different homelands had specific powers, roles and functions, as per the various homeland legislation. Such legislation included the Black Administration Act and the Black Authorities Act and other homeland specific legislation. In terms of this legislation, traditional leaders, through their structures such as the tribal and regional authorities, had powers, roles and functions on matters of land, judicial matters, educational matters, law and order, environmental conservation and development, to cite just a few examples.

The advent of democracy saw the gradual erosion of the powers, functions and roles of traditional leadership, through legislative and other means. A few examples will be used to illustrate this point.

Fulfilling the provisions of Chapter 7 of the Constitution, the Local Government Municipal Demarcation Act, 1998, (Act No. 27 of 1998) has created wall to wall municipalities in the geographic space of the Republic of South Africa. The promulgation of this Act, compounded with the other acts such as the Local Government Municipal Structures Act, 1998, Act No.117 of 1998), somewhat caused a serious blow to traditional leadership and their structures. The passing of the Municipal Demarcation Act, in comparison to pre-1994 era during which traditional leaders often claimed to have a space that was exclusively “theirs”, meant that municipalities became primarily in charge of almost everything in areas under traditional leadership. The councillors, whose election is in terms of the Municipal Structures Act, got a free reign. In the early days, some of the elected councillors who disliked traditional leaders even entertained hopes that the days for the institution were
numbered. The vigour, often misplaced, shown by some councillors, especially those who were against the institution of traditional leadership, manifested itself through the calling of meetings in the rural areas to discuss issues of development without involving traditional leaders. Tensions among the councillors and traditional leaders often followed, with some traditional leaders and their communities, especially in a Province of KwaZulu-Natal, refusing councillors from operating in their areas. The rallying cry by traditional leaders was that government had taken away their powers and functions. Councillors often dubbed traditional leaders as “agents” of anti-development and service delivery.

The Municipal Structures Act before its amendment in 2005, made provision for a 10% representation of traditional leaders in municipal councils. This was considered by traditional leaders and their structures as a lip service, as such representation excluded voting rights.

In 2005 traditional leaders, through the National and Provincial Houses, CONTRALESA and the Royal Bafokeng, who constituted the Coalition of Traditional Leaders, threatened to boycott the local government elections, and to mobilise their communities not to take part in those elections. The seriousness of the threat forced Government to move swiftly to amend the Municipal Structures Act by increasing the representation of traditional leaders in municipal councils from 10% to 20%, and that was done within 24 hours. One of the primary demands by the Coalition of Traditional Leaders was the amendment of Chapter 7 of the Constitution in order to make the areas under Traditional Councils a fourth sphere of government, a demand that government did not accede to. The local government elections were however held peacefully. The 10% increase in the presentation of traditional leaders in municipal councils has not substantially changed anything with respect to the roles of traditional leaders in these councils. To this very day, the meaningful representation of traditional leaders in local government is still a matter of great debate.

The Municipal Systems Act, 2000, (Act No. 32 of 2000) clearly outlines everything that have to do with municipal councils, including their various roles and functions, without outlining anything meaningful about the role and functions of traditional leadership.

Another key legislation regulating the affairs of traditional leadership is the Traditional Leadership and Government Framework Act, 2003, (Act 41 of 2003), as amended by the Traditional Leadership and Government Framework Amendment Act, 2009, (Act No. 23 of 2009. Sections 19 deals with the functions of traditional leaders, which it refers as the functions “…provided for in terms of customary law and customs of the traditional community concerned, and applicable legislation.” Sections 19 and 20 deal with the guiding principles for allocation of roles and functions to traditional councils or traditional leaders by the national or provincial government in respect of a range of issues, including arts and culture, land administration, agriculture, health, welfare, administration of justice, safety and security, registration of births, deaths and customary marriages, economic development, environment, tourism, disaster management, management of natural resources, dissemination of information relating to government polies and programmes and education (Sections 19 and 20 of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Amendment Act). It is important
to note is that these roles and functions are not obligatory (the roles and functions “may” be allocated), and this allocation is left as a discretion of the relevant political head (the Minister or the MEC). Given the fact that the Framework Act was promulgated almost 15 years ago, and that not much progress has been made in this regard, one begins to question the commitment of the government regarding the allocation of the roles and functions to traditional leadership.

One further point that is worth mentioning is that the NHTL has since its formation been located within the Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG), amid continuous protestations by members to the President of the Republic of South Africa. During the Annual Official Opening of the NHTL the traditional leaders often emphasized the need for their own Ministry, given the claim that DPLG was not attending to their needs satisfactorily. It was in 2007 that a Member of the NHTL, who is now the Chairperson of the Limpopo Provincial House of Traditional Leaders, Kgoshi K S Dikgale, indicated to President Thabo Mbeki that members of the NHTL were “sick and tired of being the appendage of the Department.” In response to this demand, President Thabo Mbeki, during the subsequent debate of his speech to the NHTL, committed government to establishing a Department of Traditional Affairs (DTA), which was duly established in 2009. It is a sister Department to the Department of Cooperative Governance (DCOG), within the Ministry of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs. It is now 9 years since the Department of Traditional Affairs was established. Many traditional leaders, however, continue to ask questions how the creation of DTA has benefitted them, given the limited gains.

It is also important to mention that from the almost 50 national government departments, the Department of Traditional Affairs is among the smallest, with a corresponding small budget, even when compared to its sister DCOG within the same Ministry. Roles and functions that deal with issues of culture and tradition are within the functional mandates of other departments, particularly the Departments of Agriculture, Arts of Culture, Justice and Constitutional Development, Mineral Resources, Rural Development and Land Reform, to give just a few examples. Some of these departments, and their provincial counterparts, have astronomical budgets, which they often struggle to spend, yet there is very little commitment to allocate some of the roles and functions to traditional leadership. Is it perhaps because the Framework Act explicitly states that the allocation of roles and functions should be accompanied by the necessary resources? It is the contention of the writer that unless there is political will from politicians, traditional leadership will continue to be relegated to the periphery.

In many places where one goes, the rhetoric lamentations by traditional leadership are that during the “good old times”, ironically during the pre-1994 democratic dispensation, traditional leadership possessed meaningful and effective powers in respect of a number of areas, including land allocation (they could allocate land for residential, business, grazing and other development purposes), education (their communities built community schools), safety and security, (traditional leaders were issued certificates of jurisdiction over identified criminal and civil cases, environmental conservation (through the traditional police), support to traditional councils (through annual grants) and revenue collection (through levies).
Today many traditional leaders lament the fact in the educational front, traditional leaders have limited role on matters of education, even in the rural areas. Safety wise, the traditional police are no longer supported by government, and as result, there is increased breakdown in law and order, the natural resources such as vegetation are destroyed with impunity, illegal mining (especially that of sand) is rampant in the rural communities, and the Department of Justice is no longer conferring certificates to traditional leaders to preside over certain criminal and civil cases. The finalisation of the Traditional Court legislation has been going on for more than a decade without finalisation, with some expressing the view that the courts of traditional leaders should not be regarded as proper courts. The “opt out clause” in the Traditional Courts Bill constitutes a demonstration of the traditional courts not being taken seriously. Furthermore, traditional councils in some provinces are no longer receiving the monthly grants they used to receive in the past, that ensured their effectiveness and efficiency. The goals set in the Government’s National Development Plan (NDP) Vision 2030, which envisages that by 2050 80% of the total population of South Africa will be living in the urban areas (National Development Plan Vision 2030, 2012) does little to allay fears that traditional leadership, which is rural based, will be pushed and further into the periphery.

Regarding the Provincial Houses of Traditional Leaders, there is not much difference in terms of many gains to count. The various provincial administrations have for many years been struggling to properly locate the traditional affairs directorate, including Houses. For example, depending on the province, traditional affairs were historically located in the Offices of the Premier, and now more uniformly in the Provincial COGTA departments, with the exception of the North West Provincial Government, where it is located within the Department of Culture, Arts and Traditional Affairs (CATA).

In addition to the National House of Traditional Leaders and the seven Provincial Houses of Traditional Leaders, the post-1994 legislation has established Local Houses in District and Local Municipalities where there are traditional leaders. There is a total of 29 local houses in South Africa. The primary challenge facing the local houses is that most are not functional due the lack of government support.

As far as the most local statutory structure of traditional leadership is concerned, the Traditional Councils, some traditionalists long for the old times when the then tribal authorities had some “effective” powers and meaningful roles and functions, compared to today, when these have been seriously compromised as they have lost many of their functions. Furthermore, the Traditional Councils have been democratised. In terms clause 3 (2) of the Framework Act, at least a third of the members of the traditional council must be women and 40% of the members must be democratically elected from the community.

Some would argue that the democratisation of the traditional council has diluted the essence of this important traditional structure. Others would go to an extent of saying the greatest “crime” regarding traditional councils is that due to the reality that the Framework Act has not been costed, provinces often struggle to meet the five-year timeframe requirement for the reconstitution of traditional councils, and has a subsequent impact on the reconstitution of the local houses, provincial houses and the
National House of Traditional Leaders. The challenges relating to the timeous reconstitution of traditional councils often lead to the risk of some of these structures being challenged as illegal, as they tend to go beyond their prescribed term of office.

In conclusion, given the analysis of the pre-1994 legislation and post-1994 legislation on matters of local government and traditional leadership, and the reality on the ground, there is no doubt there has been some positive developments that advance the cause of traditional leadership and their structures. For example, the institution enjoys Constitutional recognition, there are houses of traditional leaders at a national, provincial and local level, and there are developments in respect of some benefits that have accrued to traditional leaders (for example, full time employment, official residence and other benefits).

On the flipside however, it can also be argued that the legislation is place is largely a pro-local government while squeezing traditional leadership further and further to the periphery. The primary reason for this is because of a generally lack of political will – politicians are elected office bearers, and they primarily rely on their respective constituencies, including the rural masses in the areas of traditional leaders. As long as their speeches and actions resonate well with the rural masses and are assured of their votes during elections, they will continue to strive to placate these constituencies, and only pay lip service to traditional leaders.

The Ruling ANC itself has in its 2017 Discussion document that outlines “Issues of traditional leadership in South Africa – a contextual examination”, listed the first Focus Area as the “Inadequacy of a clear Shared Framework to inform the Agenda for the Traditional Leadership Affairs Institution. “It further states that “…the most critical focus issue for the system of traditional leadership, like any institution of authority, is its Independence, Self-Sufficiency, and ability to take care of itself and its members. The Document further says “We should also investigate the possibility of affording traditional leadership institutions some level of autonomy and operational independence within a system of co-operative governance. There are municipal areas like Rustenburg where the community of Phokeng is under traditional authority that provides services that would otherwise, be provided by the local municipality.” (ANC Discussion Document, 2017). In short, the Ruling ANC seems to advocate for the independence of the institution. Lastly, the Ruling Party proposes the consideration of getting traditional leadership to participate in legislative structures like the NCOP and Parliament.

Under the relationship between the traditional leadership and Municipal Councils, the ANC admits that “Municipalities accommodate traditional leaders within Council but do not have adequate resources and capacity to provide and institutional and infrastructure support to the traditional leadership institution”.

One common and effective strategy that political parties (notably the Ruling African National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party) are using in the democratic dispensation, that is a perpetuation of the strategy employed by the ethnic-based homeland parties, have been the deployment traditional leaders (mostly influential) in the National Parliament and Provincial Legislatures as party candidates. Once
deployed in Parliament or Provincial Legislatures the traditional leaders are obliged to carry out the mandate of the political parties that have deployed them.

**Proposed solutions**

There are a few solutions one can propose that can go some way in getting traditional leaders to get a better deal in this democratic dispensation. Firstly, they need to be united. The divisions among traditional leaders, be they on ethnic, provincial, political party and personally based, have provided politicians with an opportunity to exploit these divisions and effectively utilise the “divide and rule” strategy. In a meeting with the National House of Traditional Leaders in March 2018, the Deputy President of South Africa, Mr D D Mabuza, identified the unhealthy divisions among traditional leaders as a serious weakness that politicians use to get in between them. Secondly, it might be a worthwhile consideration for traditional leaders to consider being apolitical, meaning that inasmuch as citizens of the Republic of South Africa they are entitled to participate in all democratic processes, including voting, perhaps the active participation in party political activities by some is a contributory factor to the perpetuation of the “divide and rule” strategy by politicians. The ANC discussion Document itself under the “Political role of traditional leadership” states that “...it is important to emphasise that the institution of traditional leadership must strive to set itself apart from politics, and seek to be non-partisan...Traditional Affairs are about the affairs of all members of traditional communities, irrespective of their political, social, academic or any other affiliation. We would not like to experience a situation where traditional leaders contest for political leadership with their subjects and upon losing the contest, have their image dented and their traditional leadership second-guessed...it is also critical for government to accord the system of traditional leadership the respect it deserves, and help fast-track the integration of the institution in the democratic dispensation without co-option and abuse to advance selfish political interests, or creating a destructively competing alternative state that rips our country into federal enclaves characterised by ethnic identities. ”

Thirdly, traditional leadership need to be independent and self-sustainable.

It is of course the writer’s view that being non-partisan should not mean that traditional leaders should not have the right to form their own organisation that would be best placed to look after their interests, including engaging government on issues that impact on them. CONTRALESA therefore remains a relevant organisation, but it might need to reconsider its pro-ANC stance and having its traditional leaders being deployed by the Ruling Party in Parliament, Provincial Legislatures and Government. This of course should mean it should be an anti-ANC organisation.
References

2. Annual Performance Plan, Department of Traditional Affairs, 2018/19.